This study provides the direct evidence that limited attention caused by exogenous distraction influences financial market participants. Specifically, we examine the changes of analyst forecast behavior during influenza epidemics when analysts are facing attention limits resulted from the distraction of experiencing flu symptoms by their family members, relatives, colleagues, and themselves. This paper finds that higher flu intensity in the New York and New Jersey region is associated with lower degree of disagreement on target-price forecasts among financial analysts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a large body of empirical studies on how human beings are limited in their ability to process information and to perform multiple tasks simultaneously 1 , prior literature of examining the relationship between limited attention and the allocation of effort of a relatively small group of market participants that process information in financial markets to help investors form their own price expectations is scarce, and little research has been done into aspects of attention changes due to external factors or exogenous reasons. In previous studies, the focus is on the empirical effects of investor sentiment on the stock market assuming that sentiment is exogenous (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; 2007) . In a comprehensive survey of behavior finance research, Subrahmanyam (2007) suggests that much work remain to be done to answer a specific question of which agents are biased and whose biases affect prices.
This paper attempts to answer the question of whether limited attention hinders financial market participants, specifically the financial analysts, from acquiring readily available market data, processing new information, providing forecasts, and disseminating
recommendations. An extensive body of accounting literature has found puzzling evidence that investors and analysts do not always respond optimally to the information that they are evaluating; for example, Maines and Hand (1996) find that individuals' forecasts are sensitive to the magnitude of the time series components of quarterly earnings. Maines (1990) reveals a negative effect of forecast redundancy on a consensus forecast's expected accuracy. More interestingly, a clear presentation of accounting information in the financial statements does not necessarily eliminate valuation difference completely (Hirst and Hopkins 1998) . Kennedy, Mitchell and Sefcik (1998) find similar evidence that anchoring can influence the judgments and decisions of financial statement users.
Limited attention and cognitive abilities are often put forth as an explanation for this puzzle, 2 yet little is known about the causality nature between being prone to distraction and making irrational decisions. Given the reciprocal causality nature and without identifying exogenous events causing distraction, we suspect that prior cross-sectional studies may not be sufficient to uncover the reciprocity inherent in this relationship and the results are likely to be driven by idiosyncratic shocks and unobserved heterogeneity. Ideally, experimental research 1 See Kahneman (1973) and Pashler (1998) . 2 Hobson and Kachelmeier (2005) and Krische (2005) use laboratory experiments, and Koonce and Mercer (2005) , Bloomfield (2002) and Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003 use psychological theories and economic modeling to reinforce this explanation would be required to uncover the exact nature of the relationships. However, conducting controlled experiments is often impractical in a financial market setting, and natural experiments are rare and tend not to be population-representative. In this paper we use nationally representative, comprehensive longitudinal data of stock price forecasts and influenza epidemics to examine the changes of analyst forecast behavior during flu seasons when analysts are facing attention limits resulted from the distraction of experiencing flu symptoms by family members, relatives, colleagues and possibly themselves. Eccles (2005) suggests that the presence of physical features of acute upper respiratory tract viral infections caused by common cold or flu-eg, nasal congestion, runny nose, cough, and fevers-may cause discomfort, attention deficit, and mood changes. 3 Due to this flu-induced inattention among other distractions from their social environment in which the illness develops and with which they interact, analysts limit their attention or effort allocated to their work, hence reducing their ability to act as an important source of information revelation for a short period of time. Recognizing the fact that communicable diseases like influenza can spread throughout much of the country before the outbreak ends, we focus on the period when the Northeast region (New York and New Jersey) has more people experiencing flu symptoms than has the Midwest region (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska) . This research design is based on two premises. First, while the impact of the epidemic varies in different locations depending on ecological, environmental and socio-economic factors, the occurrence of influenza contagion is random. Second, among all U.S.-based financial analysts, a majority of them live and work in the Northeast region.
The financial market plays a central role of price discovery and the majority of prior research only studies the effect of market makers' behavior on price formation; for example, Corwin and Coughenour (2005) who argue that limited attention influences transaction costs by showing that specialist attention gets diverted to the most active stocks in their portfolio, thus raising transaction costs and leading to less frequent price movements in the less active ones.
This article seeks to present a contribution by focusing on a temporary irrational behavior exhibited by a special group of market participants that can influence other participants' investment decisions. Such an update in the literature is critical to assess the impact of limited attention on the information revelation process in the financial market. 3 More details of influenza epidemics and flu symptoms can be found in MacNeal (1919) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant prior research on limited attention and specifically in the context of the financial intermediation literature. Section III presents the sample data and measurement choice. Section IV introduces the empirical method. Section V evaluates the results. Section VI discusses the robustness. Section VII concludes. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Peng and Xiong (2006) are among the early theoretical studies stress the idea of limited attention, whereby cognitively overloaded investors pay attention to only a subset of publically available information. The existing literature examining the impact of limited attention on asset prices can be classified into two types: 1) to use investor inattention to explain the predictability of stock returns (Hong, Torous and Valkanov 2007, Cohen and Frazzini 2008) , and 2) to reveal the impact of investor inattention on asset prices (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009 , Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh 2009 , Loh 2010 . Along with the literature in the second category, Hong and Stein (2007) suggest that the response of prices to market news will be larger when it is broadcast in an "attention-grabbing" manner. Following this line of arguments they also suggest that a news release will have less effect if investors with limited attention are distracted for some reason. Klibanoff, Lamont and Wizman (1998) document that the prices of close-end country funds respond more strongly to changes in the funds' net asset values when the country in question is also featured on the front page of the New York Times. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) find that when a firm announces its earnings on Friday, the stock price reacts less than for the announcements on other days of the week. They attribute this finding to the distraction over the weekend. When investors return to work on the next Monday, they tend to forget the implications of the news, or at least may not feel a strong urge to react.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Other studies including Engelberg, Kurov (2010), Louis and Sun (2010) , Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) , and Sasseville and Williams (2012) provide consistent evidence supporting the limited attention hypothesis as surveyed in Hong and Stein (2007) . This paper is more related to the work in this second category but with a difference: it studies the analyst forecast behavior when setting 12-month-ahead target-price, and compare the price with the actual stock price realized one year later. In other words, prior research is focused on how irrational investors set the price, whereas this paper is interested in how irrational analysts predict the stock price assuming the price will be rationally set by the market in the next year.
It is noted that Hong and Stein (2007) do not provide any reason why investors or financial market participants in general had limited attention or being distracted in the first place. For example, in DellaVigna and Pollet (2006) , it could well be the case that Friday is considered to be an unlucky day to trade. In this paper, we focus on the exogenous shocks that can distract market participants' attention, and study the consequence of the induced-limited attention. Specifically, it finds that higher flu intensity in the New York and New Jersey region is associated with lower degree of disagreement on the 12-month-ahead target-price forecasts among financial analysts. More interestingly, analysts are more likely to over-predict targetprice for high-performing stocks and under-predict target-price for low-performing stocks. We verify this result using an alternative measure of exogenous distraction that limits analysts' attention: vaccine side-effect incidence, and we find consistent evidence supporting the limited attention hypothesis.
In addition, it can be argued that the relation between flu epidemic and the dispersion of analyst forecast is driven by sentiment. In this case, the key concern is to identify conditional variables such that the distraction of analyst forecast varies significantly across different sorted by the conditional variables. The way we identify our conditional variables is motivated by the sentiment literature, which has shown that sentiment-driven investors can over(under)-react during high(low) sentiment periods. To test this possibility, we use the DID methodology. The idea underlying the DID approach in our paper is that one can eliminate observed or unobserved difference between sentiment and flu periods. In this application, the DID estimator measures the excess outcome growth before and after inflow for sentiment compared flu. In our analyses, we find consistent evidence supporting the limited attention hypothesis.
We do not argue that the flu-induced pain, such as runny nose, sneezing, sore throat, coughing, muscle pains, and fevers, impairs the stock markets directly during flu epidemics.
Instead, it is likely that the flu symptoms distract the attention of financial market participants (analysts), and in turn they are unable to act as an additional source of information revelation during these periods, offering more optimistic recommendations for the high-performing stocks and more pessimistic recommendations for the low-performing stocks. This interpretation is similar to the conclusion in McTier, Tse and Wald (2013) that the incidence of influenza in the greater New York City area affects stock traders and in turn reduces trading activity and volatility.
III. DATA
Our primary data source is the percentage of influenza-positive test results by week and U.S. As a robustness check, we collect the vaccine side-effect data from the HHS VAERS database to measure the painfulness of being sick. This database records many different types of adverse events occur after vaccination, describes mild adverse events such as fever, local reactions, crying, irritability, life-threatening conditions, hospitalization, permanent disability, or death. We define a dummy variable vaccine side-effect with its value being one if the ratio of vaccine adverse events reported by Region 2 and Region 7 is higher than the historical monthly mean. To study the analyst forecast behavior, first we obtain the 12-month-ahead target-price forecasts for all individual analysts from the I/B/E/S database and aggregate the target-prices for each calendar month. Then, we obtain the actual stock prices realized in 1-year from the CRSP database, and define a variable forecast surprise as the percentage difference between the realized stock price and the 1-year-ahead target price forecast. We also create a forecast dispersion variable to proxy for the degree of disagreement among financial analysts. It is defined as the standard deviation of all analyst forecasts of 1-year-ahead target-price scaled by the average target-price for each firm.
In addition, we gather variables that control for factors, other than the health condition of financial analysts that influence analyst forecast accuracy. We obtain firms' financial accounting information from the Compustat database and calculate the log total assets, financial leverage, market-to-book ratio, ROA, and R&D-to-asset ratio. This approach is consistent with the analyst forecast literature. Table I provides summary statistics including means, standard deviations, and extreme values on our variables of interest.
[Insert Table I here]
We report the Pearson's correlations in Table II . An examination of the correlation matrix indicates that correlations between independent variables are generally smaller than 0.4. The low correlation among the covariates helps prevent the problem of multicollinearity that causes high standard errors and low significance levels when both variables are included in the same regression. Further diagnostics (VIF) indicate no obvious evidence of serious multicollinearity among the covariates.
[Insert Table II Here]
IV. METHODOLOGY

Ordinary Least Square Regression
We use pooled OLS regressions to measure the effect of flu epidemics on analyst forecast behavior after controlling for firm specific factors that also impact forecast accuracy. The unit of observation in the regressions is the Firm-Forecast. We use flu intensity for measuring the limited attention of financial analysts, the forecast surprise for forecast accuracy, and forecast dispersion for the degree of disagreement among analysts. For robustness, we also measure the limited attention by using the vaccine side-effect incidences. Previous research suggests firm size, leverage, profitability, growth opportunity, and R&D investment as important factors of analyst forecasts, and hence we include these variables to control for this effect. Finally, consistent with past literature, year, month and industry fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. These dependent and control variables are used for the pooled cross sectional regressions that follow.
Difference-in-Difference Analysis
This section provides an overview of standard difference-in-difference (DID) methods that have been used to study our research questions. The use of difference-in-differences methods has become very popular. The simplest set up is one where outcomes are observed for two groups for two time periods. One of the groups is exposed to a treatment in the second period but not in the first period. The control group is assumed not to expose to the treatment during either period. In the case whether the same units within a group are observed in each time period, the average gain in the control group is subtracted from the average gain in the treatment group.
This removes biases in second period comparisons between the treatment and control group that could be the result from permanent differences between those groups, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group that could be the result of trends.
The idea underlying the DID approach in our paper is that one can eliminate observed or unobserved difference between sentiment and flu periods. In this application, the DID estimator measures the excess outcome growth before and after inflow for sentiment compared flu. In our analyses, The DID methods allow us for time-invariant unobserved differences between sentiment and flu, in particular, it removes differences in unobserved characteristics that are constant over time and that affect each forecast error and standard deviation.
V. RESULTS
To begin our analysis, we fit our primary regression specification using only forecast dispersion, flu dummy, flu intensity, and the number of forecasts with year, month, and industry fixedeffects. Specifications (1) and (2) of Table III report the estimated coefficients of this baseline model.
[Insert Table III Here] The statistically significant negative effect of flu dummy and flu intensity suggests during flu seasons, analysts tend to agree with each other on their 12-month-ahead target-price forecasts. This is consistent with the limited attention hypothesis that analysts are paying less attention on the company and exerting less effort on their analysis work. However, this result does not reveal whether the limited attention caused by coughing, muscle pains or even fevers from influenza illness make analysts more or less likely to make irrational forecasts. To answer this specific question, we regress forecast surprise on the same set of variables as the ones in previous specifications, and the coefficient estimates are reported in specifications (3) and (4) of Table III . It appears that flu has no effect on forecast outcomes. Then, we break down the sample to two subsamples. The first one is for high-performance firms with 1-year realized stock price higher than the average analyst forecast and the second one is for low-performance firms with 1-year realized stock price lower than the average analyst forecast. Specifications (5) and (6) report the estimated coefficients for the sample of high-performance firms, and specifications (7) and (8) report the estimated coefficients for the sample of low-performance firms. The negative coefficients on both flu dummy and flu intensity for the high-performance firms and the positive coefficients for the low performance firms imply that during flu seasons analysts are more likely to over-forecast the performance for the "strong" firms and underforecast the performance for the "weak" firms. In other words, flu-distracted analysts tend to be more optimistic when analyzing the high-performance company stocks and more pessimistic when analyzing the low-performance company stocks. There are two potential reasons to explain this phenomenon. We can attribute this behavior to the limited attention due to the distraction from influenza-induced pains. Alternatively, flu-distracted analysts could over-react to the stock market information.
It should be noted that the above results do no control for firm characteristics; therefore, we add other factors being documented in prior research that can also influence analyst forecast behavior, such as firm size (log total assets), profitability (ROA), leverage (asset to equity ratio), growth opportunity (market to book ratio), and investment (R&D expense to asset ratio). We rerun the regressions and report the results in Table IV. [Insert Table IV Here] Specifications (1) to (8) provide similar coefficient estimates for the variables of interest, and hence we conclude that flu affects analyst forecast behavior in a significant way even after controlling for firm characteristics.
VI. ROBUSTNESS
Vaccine side-effect
It can be argued and observed that not everybody caught the flu during the flu seasons because they may have been vaccinated. In other words, we are concerned with possible robustness in the actual occurrence of flu-induced pain and distraction during flu epidemics. As a quick robustness check, we obtain the Google Trend's historical statistics of Internet search when people in the U.S. were looking for the key word "flu medicine" and plot the trend line in 2014). In light of this argument, we obtain the vaccine side-effect data to examine whether the pains caused by the vaccine, rather than the flu, can affect analyst forecast behavior. We estimate the same set of regressions, with the same specifications, as those reported in Table III and Table IV . The coefficient estimates for the flu dummy and flu intensity in Table V confirm the findings that are reported in previous section.
[Insert In this set of analyses, we use the dispersion of earning forecast, rather than the dispersion of target price prediction, to measure analyst behavior, and fit our regression specification using earning forecast dispersion, flu dummy, flu (Positive Incidents), and the number of forecasts with year, month, and industry fixed-effects. Specifications (1) and (2) of (3) and (4) of Table VI and the results are similar to the previous ones. In addition, we fit our regression specification using flu (Influenza-like Illness) and forecast dispersion.
Specifications (1) and (2) 
Alternative Explanation: Sentiment
Given the fact that there is a large body of literature on investor sentiment, the argument of market sentiment driving the relation between flu epidemic and the dispersion of analyst forecast naturally arises. In this case, the key concern is to identify conditional variables such that the distraction of analyst forecast varies significantly across different groups of analysts or time periods sorted by the conditional variables. The way we identify our conditional variables is motivated by the sentiment literature, which has shown that sentiment-driven investors can over-(under-)react during high (low) sentiment periods. To test this possibility, we use a DID regression. The idea underlying the DID approach in this robustness test is that one can eliminate observed or unobserved difference between the sentiment period and the flu period. In this application, the DID estimator measures the effect of changes in sentiment on changes in flu epidemic for forecast errors and standard deviation of forecast errors. In our analyses, The DID method allows us to control for time-invariant unobserved differences between the sentiment effect and the flu effect, in particular, it removes differences in unobserved characteristics that are constant over time and that affect each forecast error and standard deviation. 7 We measure investor sentiment using the monthly market-based sentiment constructed returns of IPOs, NYSE turnover, the equity share in total new issues, and the dividend premium.
[Insert Table VIII Here] [Insert Table IX Here] As shown in Table VIII and Table IX , we find that the relation between the flu epidemic dummy variable and analyst forecast error is not driven by sentiment. After controlling for the 7 It is worth noting that the interpretation of our results does not depend on whether sentiment is a good proxy for limit-to-attention. We simply use this variable to generate variations in the dispersion in analyst forecasts. sentiment effect, the relations between the flu epidemic and both the forecast error and the dispersion of forecast error still exist.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite a large body of empirical studies on how human beings are limited in their ability to process information and to perform multiple tasks simultaneously, prior literature of examining the relation between limited attention and information processing and forecasting in financial markets is scarce, and little research has been done into aspects of financial market participants' behavior changes due to exogenous reasons. This study provides the direct evidence that limited attention caused by exogenous shocks influences financial market participants.
Specifically, we examine the changes of analyst forecast behavior during flu epidemics when analysts are facing attention limits resulted from the distraction of experiencing flu symptoms by themselves, family members, relatives or colleagues. Because of this limited attention or effort allocated to their analysis work, financial analysts' ability to act as an important source of information revelation is reduced for at least a short period of time.
This paper finds that higher flu intensity in the New York and New Jersey region is associated with lower degree of disagreement on the 12-month-ahead target-price forecast among financial analysts. More interestingly, analysts are more likely to over-predict targetprice for high-performing stocks and under-predict target-price for low-performing stocks. We verify this result using an alternative measure of exogenous distraction that limits analysts' attention: vaccine side-effect incidence, and we find consistent evidence supporting the limited attention hypothesis.
We do not argue that the flu-induced pain, such as coughing, muscle pains, or fevers, impairs the stock markets directly during flu epidemics. Instead, it is likely that the flu symptoms distract the attention of these financial market participants (analysts), and in turn make them unable to act as an additional source of information revelation during these periods, offering more optimistic recommendations for the high-performing stocks and more pessimistic recommendations for the low-performing stocks. This interpretation is similar to the prior findings that the incidence of influenza in the greater New York City area reduces trading activity and volatility.
However, when interpreting the evidence presented in this paper, it is important to bear in mind that our results of irrational behavior of financial analysts can also be caused by human error or bias rather than a natural cognitive response to limited and uncertain information. It can be argued that in reality some analysts are prone to making human errors and biased decisions, especially when they are "under the weather" or when there is an acute illness present. Disentangle these two possible explanations of causality requires field experiments. We will leave further exploration of this issue for future research. Nevertheless, we believe the contribution of this paper to be complementary to present work that mainly studies the effect of market makers' behavior on price formation. Given that the financial market plays a central role of price discovery, this article seeks to present a contribution by focusing on a temporary irrational behavior exhibited by a special group of market participants that can influences other participants' investment decisions. Such an update in the literature is critical to assess the impact of limited attention on the information revelation process in the financial market.
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Table III. Regressions of analyst forecasts and flu epidemics
The dependent variable is analyst forecast dispersion in specifications (1) and (2) and forecast surprise in specifications (3) to (8). Analyst forecast dispersion is measured by the standard deviation of all analyst forecasted target prices divided by the average target price. Forecast surprise is measured by the difference between the realized stock price in one year and the forecasted target price divided by the average target price. Specifications (3) and (4) include both positive and negative forecast surprises, whereas specifications (5) and (6) only include high-performing stocks and specifications (7) and (8) only include low-performing stocks. The independent variables include the flu dummy variable with value being one if the difference between the flu incidence levels in NY/NJ and IA/KS/MO/NE regions is above average, flu intensity (actual difference between the flu incidence levels in NY/NJ and IA/KS/MO/NE regions, the number of analysts providing forecasts for each firm in a month, and forecast dispersion defined above. All specifications use OLS regression with year, month and industry fixed effects and firmlevel clustered standard error. t-statistics are shown in the parentheses with ***, ** and * indicating its statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table IV. Regressions of analyst forecasts and flu epidemics with firm characteristics
The dependent variable is analyst forecast dispersion in specifications (1) and (2) and forecast surprise in specifications (3) to (8). Analyst forecast dispersion is measured by the standard deviation of all analyst forecasted target prices divided by the average target price. Forecast surprise is measured by the difference between the realized stock price in one year and the forecasted target price divided by the average target price. Specifications (3) and (4) include both positive and negative forecast surprises, whereas specifications (5) and (6) only include high-performing stocks and specifications (7) and (8) only include low-performing stocks. The independent variables include the flu dummy variable with value being one if the difference between the flu incidence levels in NY/NJ and IA/KS/MO/NE regions is above average, flu intensity (actual difference between the flu incidence levels in NY/NJ and IA/KS/MO/NE regions, the number of analysts providing forecasts for each firm in a month, forecast dispersion defined above, log total assets, market-to-book ratio, leverage, ROA, and R&D expense to total asset ratio. All specifications use OLS regression with year, month and industry fixed effects and firm-level clustered standard error. t-statistics are shown in the parentheses with ***, ** and * indicating its statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table V. Regressions of analyst forecasts and vaccine side-effects
The dependent variable is analyst forecast dispersion in specifications (1) and (2) and forecast surprise in specifications (3) to (8). Analyst forecast dispersion is measured by the standard deviation of all analyst forecasted target prices divided by the average target price. Forecast surprise is measured by the difference between the realized stock price in one year and the forecasted target price divided by the average target price. Specifications (3) and (4) include both positive and negative forecast surprises, whereas specifications (5) and (6) only include high-performing stocks and specifications (7) and (8) only include low-performing stocks. The independent variables include the vaccine side-effect dummy variable with value being one if the difference between the vaccine adverse incidence levels in NY/NJ and IA/KS/MO/NE regions is above average, the number of analysts providing forecasts for each firm in a month, forecast dispersion defined above, log total assets, market-to-book ratio, leverage, ROA, and R&D expense to total asset ratio. All specifications use OLS regression with year, month and industry fixed effects and firm-level clustered standard error. t-statistics are shown in the parentheses with ***, ** and * indicating its statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
